Distorted performance measurement and relational contracts by Budde, Jörg
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 · www.gesy.uni-mannheim.de 
Universität Mannheim · Freie Universität Berlin · Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin · Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn · Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim 
 
Speaker: Prof. Konrad Stahl, Ph.D. · Department of Economics · University of Mannheim · D-68131 Mannheim, 
Phone: +49(0621)1812786 · Fax: +49(0621)1812785 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2006 
 
 
*Jörg Budde, Jörg Budde, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42,  
D-53113 Bonn; phone: +49-228-739247, 
Joerg.Budde@uni-bonn.de  
 
 
 
Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 
Discussion Paper No. 203 
Distorted performance 
measurement and relational 
contracts 
Jörg Budde*        
 
Distorted performance measurement and relational
contracts ‡
Jo¨rg Budde§
November 30, 2006
‡The authors likes to thank Christian Riegler and participants of the GEABA symposium 2006
in Bielefeld for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.
§Address of Correspondence: Jo¨rg Budde, Department of Economics, University of Bonn, Ade-
nauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn; phone: +49-228-739247; email: Joerg.Budde@uni-bonn.de
1
Distorted performance measurement and relational contracts
Abstract
This paper analyzes the use of alternative performance measures in an
agency model in which contracting incorporates both formal and informal
agreements. It is shown that under a proper use of verifiable and unverifiable
performance measures, the two types of contracts are complements, regard-
less of the principal’s fallback position. The analysis therefore contrasts earlier
results of the literature, and provides a rationale for the application of sub-
jective performance information, as it is frequently incorporated in strategic
performance measurement systems.
2
1 Introduction
In the last decade, strategic performance measurement has become an increasingly
popular device for both decision facilitating and incentive purposes. Triggered by
the insight that in a changing environment, traditional financial measures may not
suffice to properly represent a firm’s actual condition, several concepts have been
proposed which try to capture the long-term effects of managerial activities. In
most of these concepts, the use of non-financial measures is suggested to cover these
effects.1
At first, the main objective of these systems was to identify, communicate and
implement the firm’s goals within the organization. Corporate practice, however, has
meanwhile lead to the understanding that the strategy cannot be enforced without
tying employees’ compensation to respective measures (e.g., Kaplan and Norton
2001, 151). A potential deficiency in this respect is that non-financial information
need not be verifiable to a third party, and therefore at the outset cannot be assumed
to be applicable to formal contracting. Alternatively, it can be used as a basis of
subjective rewards, which may be combined with a formal contract based on a
distorted financial performance index.
In this paper, I revisit the question of how these two types of contracts are
optimally combined. To this purpose, I adapt a model of relational contracts pro-
posed by Baker et al. (1994) to a multi-task agency setting. I extend their work by
considering a different arrangement in which the relational contract is used not in
addition to the formal contract, but in exchange to (part of) it. This modification
considerably changes the results. Although it proves true that subjective rewards
1For example, the balanced scorecard as the most popular example of a strategic performance
measurement system complements its financial measures by three further perspectives (customer,
internal and learning and growth) which may incorporate measures such as customer satisfaction
or employee loyalty. For details, see Kaplan and Norton (1992, 1996).
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will not always be credible, the more elaborate contract is credible for a much wider
range. As a consequence, the contrariness of the results of Baker et al. is removed
since under the more subtle arrangement, formal and relational contracts work as
complements, regardless of the principal’s fallback position.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the
stage game of a one-period agency framework and analyzes the optimal formal con-
tract. Section 3 provides a multi-period extension of the initial agency model and
studies the use of subjective rewards. Section 4 draws conclusion concerning the
requirements for strategic performance measures. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 One-period framework
In this section I describe a one-period agency model with distorted financial per-
formance measurement which will serve as the stage game in the multi-period en-
vironment of the next section. Contrary to Baker et al. (1994), I assume that
performance measure distortion does not arise from asymmetric information, but
from the multiplicity of tasks the agent has to perform. Formally, both scenarios
are much alike (see Holmstro¨m and Milgrom 1991). The multi-task agency, however,
allows to refer more clearly to an index of performance measure congruity proposed
by Baker (2000, 2002). By a slight modification of this index, the impact of con-
gruity on the interplay of formal and relational contracts will become particularly
apparent when the multi-period model is studied.
So as a starting point, consider a situation in which a principal hires an agent to
work one-time on his behalf. The agent’s activity a ∈ Rn has multiple aspects and
cannot be legally enforced. The principal seeks to maximize his value V from the
agent’s action, net of wage payments. V (a) = d′a is assumed to be a linear function
4
of the agent’s action a, in which d = (di, . . . , dn)
′ is the vector of the marginal prod-
ucts of the different activities. V may be interpreted as the agent’s contribution to
firm value. In order to analyze the problem of performance measurement distortion
in formal contracts, I assume that V can be observed by both parties, but that it is
not verifiable to an outside party. Thus, no formal contract may be based on V .
Since neither a nor the principal’s objective V can be contracted on, the princi-
pal has to rely on a performance measure P (a) = y′a+ ² =
∑n
i=1 yiai+ ² in order to
motivate the agent for the activity. yi ∈ R denotes the performance measure’s sen-
sitivity2 with respect to action ai, and ² ∼ N(0, σ2) is a normal error term reflecting
the uncertainty related to measure P . With regard to the above mentioned issue
of strategic performance measurement, P represents the (aggregate of) financial
performance measure(s), which does not capture all relevant aspects of the firm’s
performance. Thus y 6= d.
Based on P , the principal offers a linear incentive contract S = sb+spP in which
sb is a base salary and sp is the share parameter defining the performance related
payment.
By choosing a, the agent incurs a private cost C(a). Similar to most treatises of
the linear agency framework, I assume that C is of the form C(a) = 1
2
a′a (Cf., for
example, Itoh 1991, Feltham and Xie 1994, or Baker 2000).3 In order to abstract
from risk sharing issues, both principal and agent are assumed to be risk neutral.4
The agent’s utility from his compensation S and his action choice a is given by
2See Banker and Datar (1989) for a definition.
3In order to account for task complementarities or substitutabilities, one could also consider C
to be a quadratic form a′Ca, which would proxy general cost functions as considered by Holmstro¨m
and Milgrom (1991). The resulting effects, however, could likewise be captured by a redefinition
of tasks, resulting in modified marginal products d.
4One could ask why the principal does not sell the firm to the manager. However, V not
necessarily needs to be the value of the firm as a whole. It may also represent the value added by
the manager, which cannot be sold because it is not separable from the remaining assets of the
firm.
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UA(S, a) = S − C(a). His outside options are incorporated by a reservation utility
UR ≥ 0.
The principal’s contracting problem in this model is a special case of that an-
alyzed by Feltham and Xie (1994), who allow for a risk-averse agent and multiple
performance measures. Consequently, the optimal contract can directly be derived
from their analysis. By choosing sp, the principal maximizes the expected total sur-
plus Π = V (a)−C(a), subject to the the incentive compatibility constraint a = spy.
The base salary sb is chosen to ensure that the agent’s reservation level of utility is
obtained. The optimal share parameter is5
s0p =
d′y
y′y
. (1)
from which the agency’s net total surplus becomes
Π0 = Π(s0p) =
1
2
(d′y)2
y′y
. (2)
Total profit equals (y0)′y0/2, where y0 = s0py is the sensitivity of the scaled
performance measure P 0 = s0pP . Among all implementable actions spy, a
0 = y0
describes the one which is ”closest” to the first-best action aFB = d. The alignment
of y and d is referred to as a the congruity of the performance measure P , for which
a number of metrics has been suggested (Feltham and Xie 1994, Feltham and Wu
2000, Datar et al. 2001). By inspection of (1), it is most promising to refer to Baker
(2000, 2002), who proposes the cosine of the angle between the vectors d and y as
a metric of congruity. Since the cosine can be written as
cos(d,y) =
d′y√
d′d
√
y′y
,
5See Feltham and Xie 1994, p. 433.
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it naturally relates the total surplus (2) to the first-best total surplus, which is given
by ΠFB = 1
2
d′d. The relation is formulated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 The total surplus in a risk-neutral linear agency model with quadratic
effort cost is given by
Π0 = (cos(d,y))2ΠFB.
Proof The relation directly follows from a computing Π0/ΠFB
For notational convenience, I will denote φ(d,y) = (cos(d,y))2 as the congruity
of performance measure P with respect to the firm’s objective V . By squaring,
it scales the cosine measure to the unit interval, and the second-best total profit
Π(s0) = φΠFB becomes a linear function of congruity. This will greatly facilitate
the notation of the multi-period model in section 3.
3 Relational contracts
3.1 Basic idea
As long as the performance measure applicable in a formal contract is not perfectly
congruent with the firm’s objectives, the question arises whether the non-verifiable
information can be used to improve the contract. One instrument to do this are
relational contracts. Since these ”informal agreements and unwritten codes of con-
duct” (Baker et al. 2002) are not meant to be enforced by law, they can be based
on outcomes that are observed ex post by the contracting parties alone. Obviously,
relational contracts are only of substance if it is in both parties’ best interest to
keep the agreement. In the one-shot relationship analyzed in the preceding section,
this will never be the case: the principal will always gain from refusing a voluntary
payment. Consequently, relational contracts are usually analyzed in a multi-period
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framework in which the parties repeatedly agree upon a contract. I take this ap-
proach in order to analyze how subjective rewards can be used to improve a formal
contract.
In doing so, I adapt a model of Baker et al. (1994) who analyze how formal and
relational contracts can optimally be combined in an infinitely repeated agency rela-
tionship. They assume that the subjective assessment of firm value is complemented
by a distorted verifiable performance measure. In their model, distortion stems from
the assumption that the sensitivity of the performance measure is privately observed
by the agent after contracting. Two payments are determined ex ante: a piece rate
from the formal contract which is based on the verifiable measure, and a bonus from
the relational contract which is based on the non-verifiable subjective evaluation.
Analyzing the combination of these two contracts, Baker et al. show that the
existence of a sufficiently congruent verifiable performance measure may rule out
any relational agreement. The reason of this negative result is convincing: since the
bonus is voluntarily payed, it is subject to a credibility constraint. It must be in
the principal’s best interest to pay. Under the assumption that both parties apply
Grim-trigger strategies in the repeated game,6 this is the case if the amount the
principal could save by refusing the bonus does not exceed his future benefits from
an ongoing relational contract. This benefit depends on the principal’s profit after
a potential defection. Baker et al. assume that the agent still accepts the formal
contract.7 Consequently, the principal’s fallback position critically depends on the
congruity of the verifiable measure: the more congruent this measure is, the less the
6In broad terms, this strategies can be described as follows: both parties employ cooperative
strategies (work hard and pay the bonus) as long as no party has defected, and continue by non-
cooperation as soon as one party breaks the agreement. Although this is not a unique equilibrium
of the dynamic game, the assumption is without loss of generality with respect to the obtainable
payoffs (see Abreu 1988).
7This assumption is critical for their negative results. Thus, to obtain comparability, I will stick
to this assumption in the following analysis.
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principal benefits from maintaining the relational agreement.
In my view, the analysis of Baker et al. stresses one side of the coin because
congruity may also reduce the payable bonus. Incentives already provided by a
formal contract need not be sustained by the relational agreement. Thus, if the
verifiable performance measure is almost perfectly congruent, only little fine-tuning
should be due to subjective rewards. Of course, a proper coordination of the two
contracts is essential for that purpose. In this respect, the agreement considered by
Baker et al. is rather coarse: the bonus is based exclusively on the realization of
firm value although the verifiable measure P could also be taken into account. In
the following, I will analyze such more elaborate contracts.
The most apparent way to incorporate P into the relational contract would be
to offer a bonus for a target of an aggregate measure derived from V and P . This
approach is simlar to that taken in Budde (2006), where a system P = (P1, . . . , Pm)
of partly unverifiable measures is studied. It emerges that if P is capable of mimicing
the principal’s objective V , the optimal relational contract is build on an aggregate
measure V − P 0, while the second-best contract s0 is offered as a formal contract.
That way, subjective rewards exactly provide incentives for the effort gap d−y0 not
provided by the formal contract, and the bonus is kept to a minimum. The result,
however, builds on the assumption that P can subjectively be assessed without
noise. Only then the agent can be sure to receive the bonus if he acts according to
the agreement. Under noisy performance measurement, the bonus is uncertain, and
its required amount becomes a matter of congruity and precision. Thus, although
the same logic should apply here, the results cannot directly be transferred to the
present setting.
The same coordination, however, can also be achieved by a different agreement
which does not require the precise assessment of the agent’s impact on measure P .
9
The key idea is to combine subjective rewards not with the realized amount of the
agent’s piece rate, but with its expected amount. This is possible if the verifiable
measure has not been realized when the bonus is paid. Thus in the analysis, I
assume the following timeline of events in each period t of the dynamic game:
[Figure 1 about here.]
This timeline is not unrealistic. Financial measures, such as accounting income,
usually suffer from late issue because accounts are settled not until the end of the
accounting period. Subjective evaluation, in contrast, is not subject to such terms
and may be available as soon as the agent has completed his tasks.
Given this progression, the effects of a bonus based on V −P 0 can be reproduced
by the following agreement:
1. At date t.0, the two parties sign the formal contract (sb, s
0
p). This contract is
augmented by a clause that up to date t.2, the principal may fulfil a predefined
fraction of his contract obligations by paying a certain amount B.
2. In addition to this formal contract, the parties agree that the principal should
make use of this clause if V mets a certain target V .
3. Defection is understood as
(a) the agent not delivering V or
(b) the principal not paying B although V has been achieved.
By stipulating an exchange of payments between the formal and the relational
contract, the mandatory payment which is due if the principal decides to defect can
be held at the high level of the purely formal contract. This enhances the credibility
of the relational contract. For example, if the verifiable measure is almost perfectly
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congruent, there is only little difference between the mandatory payment and the
voluntary payment against which it is exchanged. Consequently, the principal bears
only little incremental costs if he pays the bonus. Since only these incremental costs
have to be traded off against the benefits from an ongoing relational contract, the
latter is more likely to be credible.8
The following analysis studies the benefits from such an agreement. At first,
I analyze the benchmark case of an additional relational contract, as considered
in Baker et al. (1994). Their main findings are reproduced and formulated in
the present notation, thereby providing a more concise description in terms of the
congruity index derived in section 2. I then turn to the more elaborate agreement,
first considering the hypothetical case of a bonus based on V −P 0, and then proving
that the same result can be achieved with an opting-out clause in the formal contract.
By comparison of the results, it emerges that relational contracts are credible for a
much wider range of parameters when the exchange is applied.
3.2 A bonus offered in addition to a piece rate
To study the effects of a relational contract, in the following I assume that the
stage game analyzed in section 2 is repeated infinitely often. In this subsection, it
is assumed that the principal accounts for the unverifiable information by offering
a hybrid contract of the form
S = sb + spP + svV (3)
8A similar approach is taken in Pearce in Stacchetti (1998), who also consider the renegotiation
of a formal contract in the stage game. In their model, however, the instrument is solely used for
risk sharing purposes, whereas the present model focuses on congruity aspects.
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which adds payments from a formal agreement sb+spP and and a relational contract
svV . The agent’s expected utility from such a contract is EU(S, a) = sb + spy
′a +
svd
′a − C(a). If the agent trusts in the principal’s promise to pay svV , his effort
will be
a(sp, sv) = spy + svd (4)
Obviously, under the assumption that P is not perfectly congruent, the first-best
effort allocation can be obtained by this contract only for sp = 0, a purely relational
contract.
More generally, I am are interested in the optimal share parameters sp and sv of
the two contracts. Given the agent’s action choice (4), the principal maximizes
EUP (ah) = V (ah)− C(ah)− UR
= d′(spy + svd)− (spy + svd)′(spy + svd)/2− UR. (5)
The optimal value of sp, given the bonus sv, is
sp(sv) = (1− sv)d
′y
d′y
= (1− sv)s0p.
Explicit incentives are identical to those in a purely formal contract, reduced to
the fraction 1 − sv not covered by the relational contract. By substitution of sp,
the agent’s action ah = svd + (1 − sv)y0 is a convex combination of the first-best
action and the second-best action. From this, the principal’s objective (5) after
rearrangement becomes9
EUP (ah) = Π0+sv(2−sv)
[
ΠFB − Π0
]
−UR = ΠFB
[
φ+ sv(2− sv)(1− φ)− φˆ
]
(6)
9For a derivation, see appendix A.
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The principal’s utility is maximized for sv = 1. Hence, he will choose the highest
share rate sv ∈ [0, 1] for which the subjective reward is credible. To that purpose,
the payable bonus
svV = svd
′(svd+ (1− sv)y0) = sv(y0)′y0 + s2v
(
d′d− (y0)′y0
)
= 2sv
[
Π0 + sv(Π
FB − Π0)
]
= 2svΠ
FB [φ+ sv(1− φ)] (7)
must not exceed the net present value of the benefits generated by the hybrid con-
tract. As mentioned above, these benefits differ according to the principal’s fallback
position. This is either Π0 − UR (for a continued formal contract) or 0 (for ceasing
production), whichever is greater. Thus, the principal in general gains
∆UP = EUP (ah)−max
{
Π0 − UR, 0
}
= sv(2− sv)
[
ΠFB − Π0
]
+min
{
Π0 − UR, 0
}
= ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ) + min
{
φ− φˆ, 0
}]
(8)
from an ongoing relational contract in each period.
In calculating the optimal bonus parameter sv, I focus on the case of a valuable
purely formal contract, for which Baker et al. (1994) derive the counterintuitive
result that the existence of a sufficiently congruent verifiable performance measure
may rule out any subjective reward. It is derived from the credibility constraint
∞∑
t=1
∆UP (1 + r)−t =
∆UP
r
≥ svV
that the net present value of the principal’s periodical benefits have to cover the
13
payable bonus. The optimal level of sv is
10
sv =


1 for φ ≤ 1− 2r
2 1−(1+r)φ
(1−φ)(1+2r)
for 1− 2r < φ ≤ 1/(1 + r)
0 for φ > 1/(1 + r).
(9)
By inspection of (9), the contract structure derived by Baker et al. (1994, p. 17)
can be approved: A purely relational contract is offered for φ < 1− 2r. Under this
contract, the first-best solution is obtained. For 1−2r < φ ≤ 1/(1+r), both a formal
and a relational contract are agreed upon, with a decreasing portion of subjective
rewards. And most importantly, no relational contract is credible if φ > 1/(1 + r),
in which case the second-best solution as under a purely formal contract is achieved.
The last, negative result of course only holds for the case of a valuable formal
contract. If φ < φˆ, the principal will not offer a formal contract after a potential
defection, and a higher congruity cannot restrict the use of subjective rewards. It
only reduces the payable bonus and is therefore always beneficial.11
Beyond the type of the applied contract, it is of interest whether congruity may
also diminish the principal’s utility. This seems apparent because the bonus rate
in (9) is decreasing in φ for the interior solution. Actually, the conjecture can be
approved by a formal analysis:
Proposition 1 If a relational contract is offered in addition to a formal contract
and the purely formal contract is valuable, the principal’s expected net utility EUP
is
1. constant in φ for φ < 1− 2r,
10The derivation is in appendix B.
11Since these properties are obviously in line with the findings of Baker et al., I will not analyze
this situation in detail here.
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2. decreasing in φ for 1− 2r ≤ φ < 1/(1 + r), and
3. increasing in φ for φ > 1/(1 + r).
Summarizing, we see that the main findings of Baker et al. also hold in the
present framework. It is therefore well-suited to prove the effects of the contract
modification outlined in subsection 3.1. A formal analysis will be done in the fol-
lowing subsection.
3.3 A bonus offered in exchange to a piece rate
The relational contract considered in the previous section makes use of only part of
the available information. In general, not only V , but also P could be applied to
determine the amount to be paid as a bonus.
To see most clearly the effects of using the complete information, suppose for a
moment that P can be observed without noise. In that case, a relational contract
can be based on V and P in the same manner as V was used in the previous
analysis. A payment S = sb+ spP + svV + sprP is stipulated, resulting in an action
a(sp, sv, spr) = (sp+ spr)y+ svd. According to the above analysis, the principal will
choose sp and spr such that sp + spr = (1 − sv)s0p: The implemented action again
will be a convex combination of aFB = d and a0 = y0. The remaining degree of
freedom in choosing sp and spr is exploited to reduce the expected bonus svV +sprP
to a minimum. The solution is given in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If P is subjectively assessed without noise, the optimal hybrid contract
has the following properties:
1. The formal contract is identical to the purely formal contract s0p.
2. The relational contract is based on V − P 0.
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The principal’s utility from this contract, given sv, is identical to his utility
in section 3.2. The required bonus, however, may be reduced dramatically. Its
expected vaule is12
sv(d− y0)′a = 2s2v(ΠFB − Π0) = 2s2vΠFB(1− φ) (10)
The bonus now refers only to the extra profit generated by the relational agree-
ment. Since the action induced by the second-best pure formal contract alone is
the one closest to the first-best action, a combination with this contract reduces the
bonus payment to a minimum, regardless which action svd + (1 − sv)y0 is imple-
mented. Compared to (7), the bonus is reduced particularly in situations where the
verifiable performance measure has a high congruity. Consequently, a higher share
rate sv can be determined. Its optimal value is
13
sv =


1 for r ≤ 1
2
2
1+2r
for r > 1
2
.
(11)
The optimal bonus is independent of the congruity φ because the relational contract
refers to only that part of the desired action which has not been covered by the
formal contract. That way, the bonus is reduced by the same amount to which
the principal’s fallback position on the other hand is improved. Concerning the
credibility of the voluntary payment, the two effects exactly balance.
The contract modification turns both findings of subsection 3.2. The first con-
trast can directly be seen from (11): A relational contract is now credible for any
level of congruity φ and any discount rate r. Of course, the applied bonus rate might
12A derivation is in appendix E.
13A derivation is in appendix F.
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be rather low. But since the marginal bonus required to induce a deviation from
the second-best action a0 is zero, sv will always be positive. The second contrast
follows upon substitution of (11) in the principal’s profit (6), and is given in the
following lemma:
Lemma 3 Suppose P is subjectively assessed without noise and a purely formal con-
tract is valuable. If both V and P are used in the relational contract, the principal’s
expected net utility is nondecreasing in the congruity φ of the verifiable performance
measures.
Thus, if P were observed without noise, none of the previous negative results
would remain valid under a contract which uses all available information. I use this
finding as a benchmark for the more realistic scenario that P is only a noisy measure
of the agent’s performance. In that case, a relational contract based on v − P 0
becomes critical because due to the distribution of ², very low levels of P could
result from the performance measure’s noisiness. Under the proposed performance
measure V −P 0, this would entail an extremely high bonus be to paid. Consequently,
any promised reward would be refused with a certain probability, and the relational
agreement would collapse.
As outlined in subsection 3.1, however, the same effect can be achieved by re-
ferring to the payment svV instead of directly referring to P . If this is done before
the performance measure has been realized, the principal will trade off the bonus
against the expected payment from the formal contract, which, contrary the realized
amount, for a given action is bounded from above.
The most apparent way to mimic the elaborate contract would be to offer a
formal contract sb + s
0
pP at date t.0, and to allow the principal to compensate a
fraction sv of the variable payment s
0
pP by paying svV at date t.2 instead. Unfortu-
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nately, this agreement is not feasible because due to the missing verifiability of V ,
the exchange cannot be substantiated in the formal contract. The formal agreement,
however, is crucial because otherwise the principal could claim a very low level of V
in order to exchange the payment from the formal contract against a minimal bonus
payment.
Therefore, the opting-out clause in the formal contract has to determine a fixed
amount B which can be paid in exchange to a fraction sv of the variable payment
from the formal contract. In addition, the parties informally agree upon a target V
of V for which the bonus is due. If they do so, implementation of a certain action
ah = svd+(1− sv)y0 requires a target V = svd′ah of V . The promised bonus must
be such that the agent prefers ah to a0, his action induced by the formal contract
alone. By a comparison of the agent’s utility
EUA(ah) = sb+(1−sv)s0py′(svd+(1−sv)y0)+B−(svd+(1−sv)y0)′(svd+(1−sv)y0)/2
under the required action ah to his expected utility
EUA(a0) = sb + (y
0)′y0 − (y0)′y0/2
under his optimal action a0 = y0 if he waives the bonus, the minimal bonus
B ≡ sv(y0)′y0 + sv
2
[
d′d− (y0)′y0
]
required to implement ah can be determined. Although this term slightly differs
from the amount (7) required without the opting-out clause,14 it seems to have the
same undesirable properties with respect to credibility: Since the marginal bonus
14I comment on that difference in detail below.
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dB/dsv required for a divergence from the second-best action a
0 is positive, there
always exist discount rates r < ∞ for which no relational contract is credible,
regardless the congruity φ of the verifiable performance measure. Thus, at first
glance, there is no obvious improvement. However, the important point here is that
not the absolute bonus is crucial, but the incremental cost the principal incurs by
paying the bonus. In this respect, under the opting-out clause not only the bonus
B, but also the expected amount sv(y
0)′y0 saved from the formal obligations has to
be taken into account. In consideration of these savings, the principal’s extra cost
from the bonus is
B − sv(y0)′y0 = sv
2
[
d′d− (y0)′y0
]
, (12)
which is half the amount which was due under a relational contract based on V −P 0.
Consequently, the relational contract is credible to an even greater extent. The
bonus rate is15
sv =


1 for r ≤ 1
2
1+r
for r > 1,
(13)
from which the main result of this paper can be derived:
Proposition 2 If a relational contract is offered in exchange to part of a formal
contract and the purely formal contract is valuable,
1. a hybrid contract is credible for any discount rate r and any level φ of congruity,
and
2. the principal’s expected net utility is increasing in φ for any level of congruity.
Thus, by application of the opting-out clause the principal does even better than
under the contract based on V − P 0. This fact is due to the different contract type
15The derivation is in appendix H.
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required by the opting-out clause: while the contract based on V − P 0 is a linear
function of the aggregate performance measure, a bonus-type contract is used under
the opting-out clause. By this means, the payment is reduced to one half because
only the cost of the additional effort sv(d − y0) has to be compensated. A linear
contract, in contrast, generally pays two times the cost, provided the cost function is
quadratic. Therefore, the same result as in proposition 2 could have been achieved
by a bonus-type relational contract based on V − P 0.
Halving the bonus (9) in the initial contract based on V , in contrast, would
not essentially change the results of subsection 3.2. Since this bonus covers not
only the cost of the additional effort sv(d − y0), but also has to actuate the effort
(1−sv)y0 not driven by the (reduced) formal contract, the marginal bonus required
for a divergence from the action induced by the formal contract is still positive.
Thus, although the bonus would be credible for a wider range of discount rates and
congruity levels, there would still exist parameters r and φ for which no relational
contract is credible. Only by restricting the payment to the cost incurred by a
divergence from the optimal pure formal contract, the general credibility is obtained.
To complete the analysis of the hybrid contract with an opting-out clause,
I finally study the case φ < φˆ for which a purely formal contract is not valu-
able for the principal. In this case, his benefit (8) from an ongoing contract is
ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ)− (φˆ− φ)
]
, which is smaller than the amount under a bene-
ficial pure formal contract. Nevertheless, it is increasing in the congruity φ. Since
on the other hand the incremental cost (12) decreases in φ, higher levels of sv can
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be stipulated for higher levels of congruity. The optimal share rate is16
sv =


1
1+r
+
√
(1−φ)(1+rφ−φˆ(1+r))
(1−φ)(1+r)
for φ ≥ (1+r)φˆ−1
r
0 for φ < (1+r)φˆ−1
r
.
(14)
If the congruity exceeds a critical level, a hybrid contract becomes valuable. This
contract includes a minimum level sv = 1/(1+r) of subjective rewards, and a formal
contract, which would not be beneficial on its own. For higher levels of congruity,
the share rate increases and for φ → φˆ achieves the optimal level under a valuable
formal contract. Thus, in this respect, the results are conform with those of Baker
et al. Summarizing the effects with the findings of proposition 2, the advantage of
a more congruent verifiable performance measure can generally be stated:
Corrollary 1 If the principal applies the opting-out clause in the hybrid contract,
he always (weakly) benefits from a higher congruity of the verifiable performance
measures.
Regardless of his fallback position, the principal will always benefit from a less
distorted performance measure. Thus, by considering the more elaborate contract,
the paradox of the existing literature could be cleared.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, it was shown that under a proper combination, formal and relational
contract are complementary for incentive contracting. The key feature of the re-
lational contract is that it not only refers to the unverifiable information, but also
makes use of the performance measures applied in formal contracting. That way,
16A derivation is in appendix J.
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implicit incentives can be reduced to that part of the desired action which cannot
be induced by the formal contract. As a consequence, the payable bonus is reduced,
which makes the relational contract credible for a much wider range of discount
factors.
The use of all available information for the relational contract was made possible
by the contractual arrangement of an opting-out clause. Killing this option, the
principal reduces his obligations from the formal contract, which in turn reduces
his relevant cost from the bonus payment. Crucial to the use of this instrument is
the assumption that the principal is not aware of the agent’s financial performance
when he decides to pay the bonus. Consequently, the timeliness of the nonfinancial
information substantiating the relational contract becomes extremely important.
Only if this information is available at a point of time which is foreseen when the
contract is written, the principal’s ignorance of his hard obligations can be exploited
to improve the credibility of the relational agreement.
As a practical implication, norms for the preparation of strategic performance
information may become an important aspect for the provision of incentives. On
the one hand, such norms may improve the verifiability of nonfinancial performance
measures, resulting in a more congruent aggregate of verifiable measures. As the
analysis has shown, the agency will always benefit from this improvement. On the
other hand, norms may be essential to the use of the remaining unverifiable measures
if they fix periods for which the data has to be collected.
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A Derivation of equation (6)
With ah = svd+ (1− sv)y0, the principal’s expected utility (5) becomes
EUP (ah) = d′(svd+ (1− sv)y0)− 1
2
[
(svd+ (1− sv)y0)′(svd+ (1− sv)y0)
]
− UR
= svd
′d+ (1− sv)d′y0 − 1
2
[
(s2vd
′d+ 2sv(1− sv)dy0 + (1− sv)2(y0)′y0
]
− UR
Taking into account that d′y0 = (y0)′y0, this is equal to
EUP (ah) = svd
′d+ (1− sv)(y0)′y0 − 1
2
[
(s2vd
′d+ (1− s2v)(y0)′y0
]
− UR
=
sv(2− sv)
2
d′d+
(1− sv)2
2
(y0)′y0 − UR
=
(y0)′y0
2
+ sv(2− sv)
[
d′d
2
− (y
0)′y0
2
]
− UR
= Π0 + sv(2− sv)
[
ΠFB − Π0
]
− UR.
B Derivation of equation (9)
Credibility of the bonus payment requires rsvV ≤ ∆UP , i.e.,
2rsvΠ
FB [φ+ sv(1− φ)] ≤ ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ) + min
{
φ− φˆ, 0
}]
.
The solution to this quadratic inequality is
0 ≤ sv ≤ 2 (1− φ(1 + r))
(1− φ)(1− 2r) . (15)
No solution exists if the right term is negative, which is the case for φ > 1/(1 + r).
In this case, no subjective reward is promised, and sv = 0. If φ ≤ 1− 2r, the right
term is larger than one, and the credibility constraint is not binding. In this case,
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the first-best share rate sv = 1 is chosen. In all other cases, sv equals the upper
bound in (15).
C Proof of proposition 1
Upon substitution of (9), the principal’s profit (6) becomes
EUP =


ΠFB − UR for φ ≤ 1− 2r
ΠFB
[
φ+ 4r (2−φ)(1−φ(1+r))
(1+2r)2(1−φ)
]
− UR for 1− 2r < φ ≤ 1/(1 + r)
Π(s0) = φΠFB − UR for φ > 1/(1 + r).
Differentiating with respect to φ yields
∂
∂φ
EUP =


0 for φ ≤ 1− 2r
ΠFB (1−φ)
2
−4r2
(1+2r)2(1−φ)2
for 1− 2r < φ ≤ 1/(1 + r)
ΠFB for φ > 1/(1 + r).
The sign of the first and the third term is obvious. The second term is negative for
φ ≥ 1− 2r, which is always true in the relevant range of φ.
D Proof of lemma 2
The principal aims at minimizing the expected bonus svd
′a + spry
′a, which for
a = (sp + spr)y + svd becomes
svd
′ (sp + spr)y + svd) + spry
′ ((sp + spr)y + svd) .
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Differentiation with respect to sp yields the first-order condition
svd
′y + spry
′y = 0.
The respective optimal level spr = −svd′d/y′y = −svs0p is applied to proof part 1
of the lemma by svV + sprP = svV − svs0pP = sv(V − P 0).
Part 2 of the proposition is derived by substitution of spr in the above condition
sp + spr = 1− sv from which sp is sp = (1− sv)s0p − spr = s0p. 2
E Derivation of equality (10)
sv(d− y0)′a = sv(d− y0)(svd+ (1− sv)y0)
= sv(d− y0)(y0sv(d− y0)
= s2v(d− y0)′(d− y0)
= s2v
[
d′d− (y0)′y0
]
= 2s2v(Π
FB − Π0).
F Derivation of equation 11
Credibility of the bonus payment requires rsvV ≤ ∆UP , i.e.,
2rs2vΠ
FB(1− φ) ≤ ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ) + min
{
φ− φˆ, 0
}]
.
The solution to this quadratic inequality is
0 ≤ sv ≤ 2
1 + 2r
(16)
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If rle1/2, the right term is larger than one, and the credibility constraint is not
binding. In this case, the first-best share rate sv = 1 is chosen. In all other cases,
sv equals the upper bound in (16).
G Proof of lemma 3
Upon substitution of (11), the principal’s profit (6) becomes
EUP =


ΠFB − UR for r ≤ 1
2
ΠFB
[
φ+ 8r
(1+2r)2
(1− φ)
]
for r > 1
2
.
(17)
Differentiating with respect to φ yields
∂
∂φ
EUP =


0 for r ≤ 1
2
ΠFB
[
1− 8r
1+2r
]
for r > 1
2
.
The second term is positive if (1 − 2r)2 > 0, which is always true in the relevant
range of r. 2
H Derivation of equation 13
Credibility of the bonus payment requires rsvV ≤ ∆UP , i.e.,
rs2vΠ
FB(1− φ) ≤ ΠFB [sv(2− sv)(1− φ)] .
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The solution to this quadratic inequality is
0 ≤ sv ≤ 2
1 + r
. (18)
If r ≤ 1, the right term is larger than one, and the credibility constraint is not
binding. In this case, the first-best share rate sv = 1 is chosen. In all other cases,
sv equals the upper bound in (18).
I Proof of proposition 2
1. Obvious from (13).
2. Upon substitution of sv, the principal’s expected utility (6) becomes
EUP =


ΠFB − UR for r ≤ 1
2
ΠFB
[
φ+ 1+2r
(1+r)2
(1− φ)
]
for r > 1
2
.
(19)
Differentiating with respect to φ yields
∂
∂φ
EUP =


0 for r ≤ 1
2
ΠFB
[
1− 1+2r
1+r
2
]
for r > 1
2
.
The second term is nonnegative for r2 ≥ 0, which is always the case. 2
27
J Derivation of equation 14
The credibility constraint is
rs2vΠ
FB(1− φ) ≤ ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ)− (φˆ− φ)
]
.
This is fulfilled for
1
1 + r
−
√
(1− φ)(1 + rφ− φˆ(1 + r))
(1− φ)(1 + r) ≤ sv ≤
1
1 + r
+
√
(1− φ)(1 + rφ− φˆ(1 + r))
(1− φ)(1 + r)
(20)
Such sv exist if the radicand in (20) is nonnegative, which holds for r ≤ (1−φˆ)/(φˆ−φ)
or φ ≥
[
(1 + r)φˆ− 1
]
/r.
K Proof of Corollary 1
For φ ≥ φˆ, the claim directly follows from proposition 2. For φ < φˆ, an explicit
computation of EUP is complicated. Instead, consider the principal’s problem of
choosing the parameter sv in order to maximize his expected profit (6) subject to
the credibility constraint, which takes the form:
max
sv
EUP = ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ)− (φˆ− φ)
]
.
s .t. rs2vΠ
FB(1− φ) ≤ ΠFB
[
sv(2− sv)(1− φ)− (φˆ− φ)
]
.
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By the envelope theorem, the impact of congruity is given by the partial derivative
of the Lagrangian with respect to φ,
dEUP
dφ
=
∂L
∂φ
= (1− sv)2ΠFB(1 + λ) + λrΠFBs2v,
which is nonnegative because λ ≥ 0.
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contract is
signed
t.1
agent chooses
action a
t.2
V is observed
bonus is paid
t.3
P is observed
compensation is paid
Figure 1: Timeline of events
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